Title:
“Have ISIS and Al-Qaeda Joined Forces after Battle of Mosul?”
Researcher:
Mohamed Arabi
The
Egyptian Times for Research and Studies
A study issued
lately uncovered the possibility of an alliance between ISIS and Al-Qaeda after
the Battle of Mosul following the announcement of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider AlAbadi on July 10 of final victory over ISIS organization
in Mosul.
Following the fall
of ISIS:
The study
wasentitled “Do ISIS and Al-Qaeda Join Forces after Battle of Mosul?”, prepared
bythe researcher Mustafa Zahran and published at the FutureCenter for Research
and Advanced Studies. It showed that there were some questions about possible
coordination between ISIS on the one hand and Al-Qaeda on the other to resume terrorist
activities again, which calls for examining possible alliance between the two
organizations.
Most of the
opinions on the possible alliance between Al-Qaeda and ISIS are based on the
size of the intellectual intersection between extremist Islamic thought with
organizational and mechanistic approach, despite the latter’s shifts in Iraq
since its inception with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, through Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and
ending with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Nevertheless,
the scene imposes a different reality, as the appearance of Al-Baghdadi with
the demand of masses of Muslims and all terrorist organizations for his
allegiance, represented a powerful earthquake in the globalized form of
radicalism – especiallyin Al-Qaeda – with a continuous cracking to this day. It
is seen as an overturn by ISISon intellectual legacy of Al-Qaeda. It made the
allegation of Mullah "Mihamed Omar" before his death, the
subordination and dependence to orders of the current "Al Qaeda"leader,Ayman
al-Zawahiri, things taken for granted, which is not accepted by ISIS. It was
widely prepared for it in literature and in military to prevent influence on
its intellectualand organizational line in Iraqi and Syrian fronts.
Does Al Qaeda Comply?
The hypothesis
of possible alliance between the two organizations is related to the extent to
which Al-Qa'idah obeys the dictates of ISIS on the Islamic caliphate and its
allegiance, in addition to its military and combat capability and readiness. Thismade
it one of the strongest terrorist organizations regionally and internationally.
Despite the
geographical decline of ISIS in Mosul and inside Iraq, with the approaching end
of the battle in the Syrian city of Raqqa, horizontal and vertical expansions
of ISIS in Africa, Asia and Europe made it the most prominent in global terror
map than its counterpart Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the chances of alliance between
both organizations seem weakat the moment, but the transformations witnessed by
the terrorist phenomenon – between now and then – may help to achieve them.
Ideological
Contrast:
In light of the
difficulty of the alliance between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the relationship between
them will be the focus of the conflict for a number of main reasons:
First – Their
different situations from targeting other sects, as targeting the Shiite and
the Iranian state was the starting point for wideningthe dispute between both organizations.
Al-Qaeda's vision of the Shiites is summed up in that they are not a totally
infidel sect, but this does not mean allowing killing them, whereas ISIS sees
them as infidels whose bloods and money are Halal for them. In this aspect,
they do not differ from those who do not make allegiance ISIS even if they are Sunnis. Thus, they are considered
on top of the list of targeting before the American soldiers in Iraq.
This divergence
of views contributed to widening of ideological differences between both
organizations, especially with the targeting of the Shia mosques by ISIS and
Al-Zawahri’sdenial to do that. The thing that prompted the organization’sofficial
spokesman, “Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani”, before his death to accuse Al-Zawahri that
he was the reason why Iran was not targeted by Jihadist organizations, especially
Al-Qaeda, and considered it to be appeased with them.
Second– The
integration under ISIS caliphate: literature of ISIS reminds that its emergence
returned the caliphate after centuries of absence, to reconfigure Muslim groups
again. This means that the organization will not accept the dispute of anyone
in its leadership of the nation – according to its belief – after that it
presented itself as the Islamic caliphate that everyone must submit to, and
that it has an Imam to follow as guardian. Therefore, it sent a message to various
extremist organizations to join the alleged caliphate, otherwise they will die.
Thus, the organization does not accept a partner or ally until after full declaration
of faith in these notions.
In the midst of the recent events following the victory in Mosul, and the defeat of ISIS there, there wasnews about death of Al-Baghdadi, which will have a profound impact on the organization if confirmed. This may create confusion that could hinder it for a period that may be prolonged or shortened due to the size of vacancy that Al-Baghdadi will leave until his successor comes.
However, the
ISIS experience reveals something else; as it did not fall with the killing of
its former founders, overcoming those difficulties to declare its state in 2014
and expansion in a number of countries in the region. It is expected that the
organization will not be much affected by the killing of Al-Baghdadi, because
the extremist organizations do not retreat with the killing of their leaders
and figures because they are the main actors in the fighting, which makes their
death a natural and possible occurrence.
The absence of
the "leader caliph" of the organization does not mean that it may
voluntarily go into alliance with Al-Qaeda, especially after its organizational
“maturity” with stable structures that will enable it to continue its plans,
even if it loses its head and interim leader Abu BakrAl-Baghdadi.
However, the
real dilemma that will confront ISIS in the midst of the existing
transformations, the geographical reversals and withdrawals is the inability to
show its new successor similar to Al Baghdadi. It may have been satisfied with
the announcement of his death only for a period that may prolonguntil another context
and different circumstances that it sees appropriate to be declared.
Third: A
non-negotiable or bargainingapproach: The literature of ISIS dedicates areas of
emphasis on its determination not to abandon its approach, whatever the
temptations and incentives it faces. Despite the transformations witnessed by
Iraqi region and others related to the extremist case itself, it remains in its
approach since its foundation by Abu Mosaab Al Zarkawi. It is the notion
carried by the organization’s former spokesman, Al Adnani, before his death. He
said “we will not beg them to accept Allah’s religion and rule with His
Shariah. Those who accept will submit to Allah’sShariah, whereas those who
hated this will be forced and this is Allah’s religion. We will infidel the
apostates, disavow them and will be hostile to infidels and disbelievers.
Confrontations
with Al-Qaeda’s Loyal Organizations
The possibility
of alliance between ISIS and Al-Qaeda is restricted after ISIS lost its control
areas in Iraq,repeated attacks on its strongholds in Syria, and in other areas
where there are confrontations between it and military organizations affiliated
with the "Al-Qaeda".
First: The
Situation from Taliban Movement: The relationship between the Afghan Taliban
and Al-Qaeda is being re-established by Osama bin Laden prior to his death to
the days of the Afghani Jihad against the Soviet Union. Before his death, he showed
allegianceto the leader of the Taliban organization Mullah Omar until his
death. He demanded that the jihadists swear allegiance to the Afghani leader
for the necessities of this stage. Al-Zawahiri succeeded bin Laden and took the
same path.
With the
emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the launch of the so-called states,
the movement revealed the existence of its affiliate “Khorasan State” after the
allegiance of a number of the organization’sfighters and Abu BakrAl-Baghdadi.
This angered Taliban, especially in light of the rivalry between them. ISIS
sees this movement as apostate dealing with Iran and has close relations with
it. This is contrary to the organization’sintellectual attitude, which believes
that the movement has nothing to do with what it calls “Jihad” due to the
transformations that limited its role as a result of its desire to be restricted
to its Afghani reality. To achieve this, it resorted to enhance its relations
with neighbors on the account of its jihadist project.
ISIS attributes
Taliban’s apostasy to the authoritarian officials in the movement who manage
the external activities and drawing relationship with their regional and
international perimeter for long years. They trapped Mulla Mohamed Omar and put
him under compulsory residence for months that isolated him from outer world,
as he alleges. As a result, this group took over control, which made it call
for fighting ISIS. Thus, the organization sees ISIS as apostate that should be
fought. This explains ISIS operations against the movement in various places in
Afghanistan, and soon it denied them and stressed its non-adoption of ISIS
approach. This happened in the wake of targeting US soldiers near the US
embassy in Kabul on the third of May, where Talibandenied its connection to this
attack at a time when “Khorasan State” adopted this terrorist attack.
Second:
Hostility towards the Somali Youth Movement: In Somalia, the Al-Qaedamovement
has been hostile to ISIS, which talked about the movement that liquidating all
those who swear allegiance to it. ISIS literature mention that one of the
founders of the movement in Somalia, Abu Nu'manYintari, was killed by a member
of “the Youth” movement after swearing allegiance to ISIS in addition to a
field commander, Hussein AbdiGedi, who declared loyalty to be Al-Baghdadi, and
was killed as a result of his allegiance.
Third – competition for control of Yemen despite Al-Qaeda’s control in the Yemeni interior: ISIS sees that Al-Qaeda is losing the main strongholds in the state, and ISIS presents itself an alternative to Al-Qaeda’s presence. It carried out strikes against military forces loyal to the legitimate president "Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi", the Houthis and Al Qaeda as well; deepening the military dispute between the two organizations.When the organization targeted a recruitment center in Aden on August 29, 2016, Ansar al-Sharia (the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda) quickly denounced the attack and denied its participation in it. Al-Qaeda also described ISIS as a "supporter" of the deviant group against the backdrop of the attack.
In conclusion,
previous evidence indicates that the future alliance between the ISIS and
al-Qa'ida organizations remains very weak, especially that the dispute over
legitimacy (legitimacy of existence, control and allegiance) remains the
cornerstone between both organizations. Therefore, ISIS sought to consolidate
literature and mechanisms that reinforceitsidea of unilateralism and exclusive
radicalism.
Nevertheless, the
greatest threat to the transformations of that landscape in its globalized form
is not related to the alliance between terrorist organizations as much as
competition to leadership of extremist groups and in targeting adversaries. In
spite of the structural and radical differences between the two groups, their
objectives and principles are almost one and fixed withcommon enemy. Therefore,
the diversity of terrorist organizations in their contemporary forms is a major
problem in light of the fragmentation and talking about another generation that
emerges from them, that is expected to be more aggressive and more experienced
thanthe two previous generations.
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